Mental disorders of known aetiology and precision medicine in psychiatry: a promising but neglected alliance [Editorial] by Fraguas, D. et al.
This is an Open Access document downloaded from ORCA, Cardiff University's institutional
repository: http://orca.cf.ac.uk/102579/
This is the author’s version of a work that was submitted to / accepted for publication.
Citation for final published version:
Fraguas, D., Díaz-Caneja, C. M., State, M. W., O'Donovan, Michael C., Gur, R. E. and Arango, C.
2017. Mental disorders of known aetiology and precision medicine in psychiatry: a promising but





Changes made as a result of publishing processes such as copy-editing, formatting and page
numbers may not be reflected in this version. For the definitive version of this publication, please
refer to the published source. You are advised to consult the publisher’s version if you wish to cite
this paper.
This version is being made available in accordance with publisher policies. See 
http://orca.cf.ac.uk/policies.html for usage policies. Copyright and moral rights for publications
made available in ORCA are retained by the copyright holders.
Mental disorders of known aetiology and precision medicine in psychiatry: a 
promising but neglected alliance 
D. Fraguas1*, C. M. Díaz-Caneja1, M. W. State2,M. C.O’Donovan3, R. E. Gur4 and C. Arango1 
1 Department of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry, Hospital General Universitario Gregorio Marañón, 
CIBERSAM, IiSGM, School of Medicine, Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Madrid, Spain 
2 Department of Psychiatry and Langley Porter Psychiatric Institute, University of California, San 
Francisco, CA, USA 
3 Department of Psychological Medicine and Clinical Neuroscience, MRC Centre for Neuropsychiatric 
Genetics and Genomics, Cardiff University School of Medicine, Heath Park, Cardiff, UK 
4 Department of Psychiatry, Neuropsychiatry Section, Perelman School of Medicine, University of 
Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA, USA 
Personalized or precision medicine is predicated on the assumption that the average response to 
treatment is not necessarily representative of the response of each individual. A commitment to 
personalized medicine demands an effort to bring evidence-based medicine and personalized 
medicine closer together. The use of relatively homogeneous groups, deﬁned using a priori criteria, 
may constitute a promising initial step for developing more accurate risk-prediction models with 
which to advance the development of personalized evidence-based medicine approaches to 
heterogeneous syndromes such as schizophrenia. However, this can lead to a paradoxical situation 
in the ﬁeld of psychiatry. Since there has been a tendency to loosely deﬁne psychiatric disorders as 
ones without a known aetiology, the discovery of an aetiology for psychiatric syndromes (e.g. 
22q11.2 deletion syndrome in some cases of schizophrenia), while offering a path toward more 
precise treatments, may also lead to their reclassiﬁcation away from psychiatry. We contend that 
psychiatric disorders with a known aetiology should not be removed from the ﬁeld of psychiatry. 
This knowledge should be used instead to guide treatment, inasmuch as psychotherapies, 
pharmacotherapies and other treatments can all be valid approaches to mental disorders. The 
translation of the personalized clinical approach inherent to psychiatry into evidence-based 
precision medicine can lead to the development of novel treatment options for mental disorders and 
improve outcomes. 
For a doctor seems not even to study health in this way [by studying the idea of health], but the 
health of man, or per-haps rather the health of a particular man; it is individuals the he is healing 
(Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, I, 6, 1097a) 
Personalized medicine, now generally referred to as precision medicine, which can be described as 
providing the right patient with the right treatment at the right dose at the right time, has become a 
promising and controversial issue in healthcare research in recent years (Schork, 2015). Precision 
medicine proposes the use of an individual’s genetic and epigenetic information, clinical 
symptomatology, observable biomarkers, and environmental factors to tailor the best therapeutic 
option to each person in each condition (Ozomaro et al. 2013) and, further, to implement the best 
preventive strategy for speciﬁc diseases or conditions in speciﬁc groups or communities (Gillman & 
Hammond, 2016). 
Psychiatric disorders, such as schizophrenia, depression, anxiety, obsessive-compulsive and autism 
spectrum disorders, as well as some disorders from other ﬁelds of medicine such as oncology and 
neurology, are heterogeneous syndromes rather than speciﬁc dis-eases (Paulus, 2015). Thus, they 
constitute important targets for personalized medicine. Therapeutic research in psychiatry has 
generally implicitly treated psychiatric disorders as homogenous conditions resulting from a deﬁned, 
yet still largely undiscovered, set of aetiological factors. Yet there is overwhelming evidence that 
psychiatric categories might be best conceptualized as heterogeneous endpoints resulting from 
multiple aetiological processes, each of which in turn may be caused by a large number of genetic 
and environmental factors, some directly inﬂuencing brain structure and function (van Os et al. 
2010), others possibly doing so indirectly, for example via the immune system. 
Personalized or precision medicine assumes that the average response to treatment is not 
necessarily representative of the response of each individual. Indeed it may not even be 
representative for any individual (de Leon, 2012). If this hypothesis is applicable to psychiatry, it may 
help explain the failure to develop novel pharmacological treatments in psychiatry (Paulus, 2015) 
despite the advances that have been made in at least partially understanding some of the 
neurobiological bases of psychiatric disorders in recent years (Bargmann, 2015). 
An alternative approach to optimize research on treatment of psychiatric disorders relies on risk-
prediction models. Such models, rooted in a Bayesian approach to uncertainty reasoning, encourage 
a pragmatic focus on prediction, with the aim of estimating the probability or risk of other precise 
outcomes within a speciﬁc period at an individual level. Therefore, they constitute valuable tools to 
guide the implementation of speciﬁc solutions for speciﬁc conditions, which is the basis of 
personalized medicine (Paulus, 2015). 
Risk-prediction models are based on the identiﬁcation and analysis of demographic, clinical, and bio-
logical markers that allow the formation of more homogeneous groups, up to the extreme scenario 
of N-of-1 groups and N-of-1 trials (Schork, 2015), close to or in line with idiographic research 
approaches (Ng & Weisz, 2016). In practice, this involves under-standing everyday clinical care as a 
series of N-of-1 trials (Schork, 2015) or, more realistically, subdividing psychiatric syndromes into 
more homogeneous groups (Ng & Weisz, 2016), thus reducing the inherent heterogeneity of 
psychiatric syndromes. This can be seen as an iterative approach, and incorporation of data obtained 
from these more homogenous groups may beneﬁt further development of more accurate risk-
prediction models. This is because, while the approach of assessing heterogeneous syndromes as a 
single entity substantially reduces the effect size of predictors, the use of more homogeneous 
subgroups facilitates the identiﬁcation of new predictors, thus leading to improved risk-prediction 
models (Wen & Lu, 2013). 
The problem of lack of homogeneity in clinical studies, especially in drug randomized control trials, 
has been a recurrent theme in recent decades (Feinstein & Horwitz, 1997). As a result, the use of 
new statistical techniques that make it possible to describe patient populations as a whole and 
patients as individuals, such as random-effects linear models, has been encouraged (Schork, 2015). 
Unfortunately, these recommendations have still not been incorporated into most evidence-based 
studies (Schork, 2015). Schematically, evidence-based medicine approaches focus on average data to 
deﬁne one-size-ﬁts-all treatments, whereas personalized or precision medicine aims to obtain 
customized treatments for each speciﬁc individual or group. In a sense, evidence-based medicine 
deliberately ignores outliers, while personalized medicine pays special attention to outliers (de Leon, 
2012; Schork, 2015). 
A commitment to personalized medicine demands a major effort to bring evidence-based medicine 
and personalized medicine closer together, in an attempt to achieve, insofar as possible, 
personalized evidence-based medicine (de Leon, 2012; Ng & Weisz, 2016). Doing so may be hindered 
by factors such as practical difﬁculties in implementing personalized treatments for mental 
disorders, methodological difﬁculties in designing clinical trials with a personalized medicine 
approach, barriers to addressing public health issues, dualistic thinking regarding psychiatric illness 
(e.g. or-ganicfunctional/hardware–software dichotomies), un-realistic expectations about 
personalized medicine, conﬂicts of interest (Kendler, 2012) or potential measurement burden due to 
increase of clinical and/or biological assessments. Moreover, the fact that the aetiology of most 
mental disorders is far from being clariﬁed poses additional, non-negligible challenges. 
For these reasons, relatively homogeneous groups deﬁned using a priori criteria, such as common 
genetic, biological or environmental factors, may constitute the initial phases of developing more 
accurate models with which to advance the development of personalized evidence-based medicine 
approaches and eventually to advance the understanding of the biological underpinnings of 
psychiatric syndromes (de Leon, 2012). 
The case of schizophrenia, as a highly heterogeneous psychiatric syndrome, may be useful to 
illustrate this issue. The heterogeneity of schizophrenia has been conﬁrmed in various domains, 
including genetics, neurodevelopment, neuroanatomy, symptoms, treatment response, and 
outcomes (van Os et al. 2010). The attempt to tackle such a heterogeneous dis-order with the very 
narrow range of different therapeutic alternatives that are partially effective on some of the core 
symptoms of the disease (i.e. positive symptoms) but have close to no effect on others (i.e. negative 
and cognitive symptoms) could explain, to some extent, why there has been little improvement in 
functional outcome in the past century (Hegarty et al. 1994). For decades, authors from different 
theoretical schools have called for the use of more homogeneous categories to guide the treatment 
of schizophrenia. However, attempts to assess treatment response according to more homogenous 
clinical subgroups in schizophrenia have been scarce (Kirkpatrick et al. 2000; de Leon, 2014), and 
have been only limitedly tested in randomized clinical trials (Umbricht et al. 2014). 
In this scenario, there is a need for novel methodological strategies that can help develop new 
treatment options. Risk-prediction models may offer a unique opportunity to assess the 
effectiveness of new or even not so new treatment options in a personalized-medicine (or proxy) 
framework. Unfortunately, current knowledge is not sufﬁciently developed to allow for the 
production of accurate risk-prediction models applicable to precision medicine at a clinical level. 
A multiclass likelihood-ratio approach, based on a forward selection algorithm that considers high-
order and high-dimensional gene–gene/gene–environment interactions, could be used to deﬁne 
homogeneous groups and improve the accuracy of these potential risk-prediction models (Wen & 
Lu, 2013). However, implementation of this approach for the study of schizophrenia may well be 
hindered by the extreme complexity and multidimensional nature of this condition, which 
undermines the validity and reliability of these models. 
An alternative approach is the use of biological mechanism-based subgroups based on shared 
speciﬁc underlying neural processes or aetiological factors. As an example, we take chromosome 
22q11.2 deletion syndrome (22q11.2DS). This syndrome, also called velocardiofacial syndrome or 
DiGeorge syndrome, is associated with high rates of schizophrenia spectrum (up to 40% in adults) 
and other psychiatric disorders [e.g. mood and anxiety disorders, obsessive-compulsive disorder 
(OCD)]. It is usually deﬁned as a genomic neurodevelopmental disorder with markedly variable 
expressivity in clinical and cognitive presentation. Remarkably, there is no speciﬁc symptomatic 
proﬁle in subjects with 22q11.2DS schizophrenia, which instead encompasses the range of the 
disorder in the general schizophrenia population (Owen & Doherty, 2016). 
Nevertheless, among subjects with schizophrenia, those who also have 22q11.2DS must constitute a 
relatively homogenous group in which shared aetiological factors presumably lead to more similar 
pathophysiology compared with random pairs of individuals drawn from the whole population of 
people with the disorder. Prevalence of 22q11DS in patients with schizophrenia is estimated at 
about 0.30% (Rees et al. 2014). Models based on 22q11.2DS would therefore have a direct impact 
on only a minority of subjects with schizophrenia. Still, they provide an appropriate scenario for 
developing better risk-prediction models and for testing speciﬁc responses to speciﬁc treatment 
options. This is all the more applicable as recent results suggest that neurons derived from induced 
pluripotent stem cells (iPSCs) could constitute a valid in vitro model of schizophrenia in 22q11.2DS, 
since they recapitulate the microRNA expression patterns expected of in vivo 22q11.2 
haploinsufﬁciency (Zhao et al. 2015), thus broadening the opportunities to identify new tar-gets for 
intervention. This is not to say that 22q11.2DS deﬁnes a precisely aetiologically homogeneous 
clinical subgroup of schizophrenia. In fact, clinical expression in subjects with 22q11.2DS and other 
copy number variations (CNV) is, as noted, highly variable, likely a consequence to some degree of 
contributing common alleles across the genome (Tansey et al. 2015) (i.e. ‘genetic background’) as 
well as the variable contribution of multiple small effect genes within the CNV region (Sanders et al. 
2015). Recent promising research on treatment strategies in autism spectrum disorder phenotypes 
focusing on known genetic aetiologies, such as fragile X syndrome (Hagerman et al. 2014)or Phelan-
McDermid syndrome (Harony-Nicolas et al. 2015), are two other valuable examples of using bio-
logical mechanism-based subgroups for the development of precise treatments. 
In addition to the identiﬁcation of more homogeeous populations based on genetic factors, 
personalized medicine efforts in psychiatry could beneﬁt from subtyping based on other biological 
variables such as error-related negativity in OCD, and from novel computer techniques allowing for 
the collection and interpretation of large amounts of real-time data at the individual level, such as 
ecology momentary assessments (Veling et al. 2016). This could help identify triggers and early signs 
of psychopathology for each individual and favour the development of personalized risk-prediction 
algorithms for patients with depression, anxiety, psychosis and other mental disorders. 
Perhaps uniquely in medicine, psychiatry faces a paradoxical situation that, unless guarded against, 
poses a potential hindrance to the development of personalized treatments for mental disorders. 
Historically, there has been a tendency to loosely deﬁne psychiatric disorders as ones without a 
known or observable aetiology, and the discovery of an aetiology has tended to lead to a 
reclassiﬁcation away from psychiatric toward medical conditions and to transfer of care outside 
psychiatry (Arango & Fraguas, 2016). While a common aetiological factor makes schizophrenia in 
patients with 22q11DS a more homogeneous condition, whose study has the potential to help 
personalized medicine move forward in the ﬁeld of psychiatry, knowledge of this aetiological factor 
puts 22q11.2DS schizophrenia at risk of being reclassiﬁed as a ‘medical’ disease. Thus, while 
discovery of the aetiology of psychiatric syndromes offers a path toward both more precise 
treatments and a deeper general understanding of pathophysiological mechanisms, psychiatry may 
lose its role of caring for people with these conditions (Arango & Fraguas, 2016). 
Many medical conditions have a relatively well-known pathophysiology (e.g. diabetes) or an 
immediate aetiology (e.g. stroke) but an underlying aetiology that remains undiscovered. However, 
most psychiatric disorders have not only an unidentiﬁed underlying aetiology but also an unknown 
proximate cause and pathophysiology. Within this framework, should schizophrenia related to 
22q11.2DS or any other psychiatric disorder with a known aetiology (or supposedly known aetiology) 
be removed from the realm of psychiatry just because of a known medical aetiology? We suggest 
the answer should be a resounding no. To argue otherwise is implicitly dualistic and conjures the 
ghost of Descartes. Moreover, even in the hypothetical and improbable event that we were to 
discover that all mental disorders have a speciﬁc, albeit complex, biological aetiology, in the absence 
of a simple cure, there will inevitably still be a range of environmental factors (and gene-
environment interactions) to be dealt with in clinical practice, and their multiple symptomatic, 
cognitive, and/or behavioural manifestations require psychiatric approaches, both medical and non-
medical. In the current context, we note that doing so is also likely to hamper the development of 
personalized medicine in psychiatry. On the contrary, conditions such as schizophrenia related to 
22q11.2DS should serve as opportunities for psychiatry to become a more collaborative and 
multidisciplinary specialty. 
Psychiatrists deal with unique subjects with unique sets of factors that drive their achievements and 
difﬁculties. At the end of the day, every clinical consultation needs a personalized medicine 
approach. As clinicians, it is also our responsibility to contribute to the development of better and, 
insofar as possible, more precise treatments. Psychotherapies, pharmacotherapies or other 
treatments can be all valid approaches to complex brain conditions such as mental disorders. As one 
among several clinical neuroscience disciplines including neurology and neurosurgery, psychiatry will 
require training in converging diagnostic methods and therapeutic interventions. This could help 
psychiatry distance itself from previous dogmatic or quasi-dogmatic approaches that have 
conditioned the development of the specialty over time. Otherwise, psychiatrists will lack the 
practical abilities required to manage mental disorders in an efﬁcient manner. 
Research efforts to translate the personalized clinical approach inherent to psychiatry into evidence-
based precision medicine can pave the way to success in the search for optimal treatment options 
for mental disorders. 
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